o係U Lib傾o左三粒幾鐘，2145 Second Group Project終於完工
不過做乜咁疲態？邊傾邊執手尾，轉數勁低，呢兩日都係咁
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GPA 2145 (Electoral Studies) Second Group Project
Task: As an advisor of Beijing, drafting a constitutional reform proposal of Hong Kong
Introduction
The aims of our reform are to ensure a smooth and stable transition to universal suffrage and to
guarantee the election result (especially in the executive branch) would not be unacceptable to China.
The idea is that we could allow a more open reform in the legislation but impose a tighter control on the
Chief Executive election.
Priority of stakeholders:
1. The government of mainland China
2. Business and commercial sectors
3. Pro-Democracy camp
I. Chief Executive
Aims of Reform
To ensure the publicly-elected Chief Executive would be a Beijing-friendly candidate that is able to
maintain a good relationship between Hong Kong and China, and also capable of preserving and
facilitating the capitalist system of Hong Kong.
This could be achieved by a proper design of the composition of the nominating committee, as no
inappropriate candidate could be nominated. In addition to this, measures which are in favor of the
candidates who enjoy support from commercial/business sector are adopted, so that could encourage
the business sector's involvement.
General Features
1. A new composition of the nomination committee
2. More than one nomination could be made by each member in the committee
3. Loosen constraints on election campaign
Pace of Reform
There will not be any reform in 2012, but universal suffrage will be adopted since 2017. The most
important feature would be the design of the nomination committee.
A nomination committee, which consists of 400 members in total, will be divided into four main sectors,
each consisting of 100 members. Three of the currently existing sectors in the Election Committee,
namely the business and financial sector, the professional sector and the labour, social service and
religion sector, will be preserved in new system. However, the size of each sub-sector will be
reduced to half due to the reducing size of the whole committee.
For the last sector, political sector, there will be a radical change. We have proposed a reform of
Legislative Council, enlarging the size of LEGCO to 100 seats. Under the new system, the political
sector of the nomination committee will be entirely filled by all legislators.
In order to be an eligible candidate, every candidate should get the nomination of around 40% to 50%
(which is up to the bargaining) committee members. However, each member can nominate more than
one candidate, so there can still be more than one candidate running in the election. Candidates getting
sufficient nominations will then enter the universal suffrage.
We believe it would be a proposal which is easier to be approved by both sides as it involves certain
degree of uncertainty.
For mainland China the risk would not be unacceptably high, as the democratic camp would has veto
power only if they could control the legislation. And the possibility of such a significant winning in
legislation is uncertain, given the serious fragmentation, number of fractions in the democratic camp
and all other unfavorable measures adopted in the legislation election, such as the removal of the
run-off system. For the democratic camp they maybe able to have veto power in the nomination. And
wining the enough amounts of seats is not completely impossible based on the 6-3-1 ratio of the
legislation election in the past. This uncertainty makes both sides easier to be convinced by this proposal.
This proposal is also an admirable compromise and involves the largest amount of possible tolerance
of democrats, in accordance with our priority.
For mainland China this would be a moderate proposal. First, this system the quality of candidates is
guaranteed because the nominating committee could screen out any disfavored candidate so that the
democrats are not possible to make nomination without the consent of China. But, at the same time,
this proposal also shows certain degree of tolerance, because the system design allows democrats
to have veto power if they are able to win 40% to 50% seats in the legislation. There is room for
bargaining or compromise outside the system.
For democrats this proposal is of course not an attractive one (as our priority is given to mainland
China) but it nonetheless allows them to strike for a veto power which could serve as could be an
essential political resource in the bargaining process of the nomination of candidates and eventually
influence the election result.
Although in our proposal it appears that we advocate a rush to a universal suffrage, it is actually a
step-by-step transition to universal suffrage if we pay attention to the legislation reform at the same
time.
According to our reform proposal of the legislation, when the first publicly-elected Chief Executive is
being nominated there are still thirty functional constituency legislators in the council. Therefore it is
pretty sure that the democrats would not be able to control the legislation, and thus all nominated
candidates are basically designed by mainland government and business sector. The democrat may
not be able to control the legislation before the second universal election when the functional constituency
is eliminated.
We believe that a step-by-step reform is necessary. And for the first universal election of Chief
Executive, this is need for minimizing the risk as there is plenty of uncertainty. After this, since both
sides have accumulated enough experience, a more competitive election is welcome.
In addition to the nomination committee there are also reforms in some minor arrangements.
The election expenditure would be increased. Today's limit of election expenditure is 9.5 million dollars.
We propose a higher upper limit, as high as 25 million dollars, which is the amount Donald Tsang
successfully raised this year. Besides, advertisement on televisions will also be allowed. It is designed
to help the candidate who enjoys support from Beijing, as he is expected to have sufficient financial
support from the business sector.
The currently adopting two-round run-off system will be cancelled. The candidate who gets more
votes than all other candidates, regardless of whether there are more than 50% of total votes, will win
in the election.
Besides, the removal of the run-off system will be more advantageous to pro-Beijing candidates.
Pro-Beijing camp is better in pre-election coordination than pro-democracy camp. Therefore, there will
probably only one pro-Beijing candidate entering universal suffrage. On the other hand, it is more
possible for a split in the pro-democracy camp. If the run-off system is eliminated, votes of pro-democracy
camp may be scattered and the only pro-Beijing candidate will be benefited.
II. Legislative Council
Aims of reform
The aims of reform is to expand democrats' advantages in LegCo as a mean to compensate for the
loss of Chief Executive (CE) election; enlarge the assembly size to 100 seats; transform all LegCo
seats into geographical constituencies (GCs) by 2020; abolish the provision on the bicameral voting
system and finally can eliminating the functional constituencies (FCs); remain the system of
proportional representative system.
General Features of the Proposed System
The proposed reform will include:
1. Enlargement of assembly size
2. Elimination of FCs
3. Remain of PRLR electoral formula
Rationale of entire reform
As mentioned in the previous part, since democrats could not gain much power in universal suffrage
in CE, we propose to maintain democrats' institutional advantages in LegCo. Our assumption is that
voter turnout and vote proportion will remain more or less the same in 2020, i.e. 60% of voters will
vote for democrats; 30% votes for pro-China parties; and the remaining 10% for centralist parties,
which will gradually disappear. And higher voter turnout, according to democrats' analysis, should
be an advantage for them. Therefore, the following section will illustrate how to settle democrats
down in the LEGCO, while expanding LEGCO's capacity simultaneously.
The rationale for this proposition is that, China's expectations can be catered since LEGCO will not
become a strong opposition body against the CE; the democrats will also remain their power, while it
also provides space for expansion of power in LegCo. The assumption behind this arrangement is,
since the stance of China and democrats are different. China expects that LegCo will remain the same
power, while it also cannot deny the power that the democrats have already built in LegCo. On the
other hand, democrats wish to strengthen the capacity of LegCo, so that they can enjoy more power
in LegCo.
Content of Reform
First, we propose that more GCs will be introduced after 2008. According to democrats' conventional
wisdom, the higher capacity of GOTV, the more probability for democrats to win in elections. Despite
occasional failures, democrats still believe that they are more able to gain victory in elections,
especially in LegCo elections. We believe that by exploring more GCs in LegCo, democrats' can still
remain its institutional power under the advantages in elections.
Another institutional arrangement targeting FCs, is to abolish the provision on the bicameral voting
system. From the past experience of this provision, FCs could enjoy exclusive power from GCs,
democrats found hard to pass bills because of this system. In order to make FCs power fade, the
provision of bicameral voting system should be slashed. Since this arrangement is not written in Basic
Law, which implies that it can be amended, we suggest that combining two types of voting into a
collective one. Again, the reasons why those FCs will accept this proposal, is by both soft and hard
strategies: the former refers to convincing and negotiation with FCs; the latter refers to pressure to
political parties.
Finally, we would suggest that the system of PRLR will remain the same after LegCo reform. The
above suggestions have created a favourable condition for democrats; we still have to balance the
benefits from those pro-China. This conclusion is drawn from exclusion of other system. We believe
that single-member-system is not suitable for Hong Kong because cleavages are not very clear, two
major parties are still evolving. But mixed system, like STV, will also lead to more serious intra-party
fragmentation, which is not desirable either. Therefore, we choose to remain PRLR in the reform.
Pace of Reform
Our first working plan is increasing assembly size gradually by expanding more GCs seats. The goal is
100 seats by 2020. By 2008, due to the April 2004 NPCSC verdict, the composition will still be 30 GCs
and 30 FCs. We propose that by 2012, 20 seats will be introduced for GCs, and the assembly size will
enlarge to 80 seats. Then in 2016, another 20 seats will be added. By 2016, including the FCs, 100
seats will be elected in LegCo; while the composition will be 70 GCs and 30 FCs. In 2020, we suggest
to eliminate all FCs and add 30 seats simultaneously.
We propose the increasing seats in existing constituencies by proportion of population. Here is the
prediction of district magnitude in the foreseeable future, subjected to change with reference to
change of population pattern.
The rationale behind this enlarging is to cultivate more autonomy for GCs seats so that it is smoother to
slash FCs finally. Since we believe that FCs has to be eliminated eventually, we first relieve the
prominence of FCs by introducing more GCs. By adding more GCs, different parties varied from
pro-China to pro-democracy can build up their party capacity. On the other hand, more GCs can also
open up for some FCs to join the GCs elections. We have contemplated that why FCs members will
approve this proposal since it is irrational for them to fire themselves. Our strategies to comfort the
FCs members, are to settle them down in other arrangements, in which direct election is one of the
method.
III. Political Impacts of our Proposal
Some people may criticize our reform proposal will affect the executive-legislative relation as the
democrats might have different views on policies with the pro-China Chief executive. Our prediction is
opposite to this point of view. We can predict that after the opening of election of Chief Executive, the
cleavage between the democrats and the executives will less likely be the democracy. Instead, the
cleavage will transform into another type. It might become a class cleavage between politicians and
bureaucrats.
In order to deal with this situation, we suggest that the executives can appoint party members into the
executive committee and bureau heads. This can help improving the effectiveness and efficiency in
passing bills from government in the LegCo and prevent gridlock. The LegCo members can also enter
policy bureaus and advisory bodies in the government so as to improve executive-legislative
relationship by more understanding and bargaining.
The other impact would appear within the LegCo, the cleavages between parties will rearranged. The
former cleavage in democracy will be less focused on when Chief executive and all LegCo members
are elected by Hong Kong people. The new cleavage might be a class cleavage between grassroots
and businessman, or a cleavage of ideologies. Parties will argue on different priorities of policies
when the problems of democracy are less immediate and less focused on.
Thirdly, since the abolishment of the FCs, we can predict that more members in the LegCo will have
party background. Party affiliation in LegCo can be strengthened. This will also increase parties
capacities and promote the development of party politics in Hong Kong. As more and more seats are
added, more and more chances will be there for younger and newer members in parties. This is a
good ladder for young politicians and a good way to train new political elites. As many former FCs has
no party background, they can be absorbed into different parties. Through entering parties they will
have a new way of being elected as a LegCo member. Parties can provide them with resources in
succession in elections, and former FCs can bring new insights and elements into party.
傾2145 Group Project，延續慣例，o係好多細節位拗o左好耐
足足砌o左6個鐘先砌到，對我o黎講，咁o既方案絕對係違心
P.S.層聚，六樓呢班X樣，真係玩到冇o野好玩，溝到冇o野好溝
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MOSCOW, Russia (AP) -- Former President Boris Yeltsin, who engineered the final collapse of the
Soviet Union and pushed Russia to embrace democracy and a market economy, has died, a Kremlin
official said Monday. He was 76.
Kremlin spokesman Alexander Smirnov confirmed Yeltsin's death, but gave no cause or further
information. The Interfax news agency cited an unidentified medical source as saying he had died of
heart failure.
Although Yeltsin pushed Russia to embrace democracy and a market economy, many of its citizens
will remember him mostly for presiding over the country's steep decline.
He was a contradictory figure, rocketing to popularity in the Communist era on pledges to fight
corruption -- but proving unable, or unwilling, to prevent the looting of state industry as it moved into
private hands during his nine years as Russia's first freely elected president.
He steadfastly defended freedom of the press, but was a master at manipulating the media.
He amassed as much power as possible in his office -- then gave it all up in a dramatic New Year's
address at the end of 1999.
Yeltsin's greatest moments came in bursts. He stood atop a tank to resist an attempted coup in August
1991, and spearheaded the peaceful end of the Soviet state on Dec. 25 of that year.
Ill with heart problems, and facing possible defeat by a Communist challenger in his 1996 re-election
bid, he marshaled his energy and sprinted through the final weeks of the campaign. The challenge
transformed the shaky convalescent into the spry, dancing candidate.
But Yeltsin was an inconsistent reformer who never took much interest in the mundane tasks of day-
to-day government, and nearly always blamed Russia's myriad problems on his subordinates.
Yeltsin greatly damaged his democratic credentials by using force to solve political disputes, though he
claimed his actions were necessary to keep the country together.
He sent tanks and troops in October 1993 to flush armed, hard-line supporters out of a hostile Russian
parliament after they had sparked violence in the streets of Moscow. And in December 1994, Yeltsin
launched a war against separatists in the southern republic of Chechnya.
Tens of thousands of people were killed in the Chechnya conflict, and a defeated and humiliated
Russian army withdrew at the end of 1996. The war solved nothing -- and Russian troops resumed
fighting in the breakaway region in fall 1999.
In the final years of his presidency, Yeltsin was dogged by health problems and often seemed out of
touch. He retreated regularly to his country residence outside Moscow and stayed away from the
Kremlin for days, even weeks at a time. As the country lurched from crisis to crisis, its leader
appeared increasingly absent.
Yet Yeltsin had made a stunning debut as Russian president. He introduced many basics of
democracy, guaranteeing the rights to free speech, private property and multiparty elections, and
opening the borders to trade and travel. Though full of bluster, he revealed more of his personal life
and private doubts than any previous Russian leader had.
"The debilitating bouts of depression, the grave second thoughts, the insomnia and headaches in the
middle of the night, the tears and despair ... the hurt from people close to me who did not support me at
the last minute, who didn't hold up, who deceived me -- I have had to bear all of this," he wrote in his
1994 memoir, "The Struggle for Russia."
下午返屋企補習，唔係fa？又唔記得默書？話就話考哂呈分試o者
o係U Lib傾o左三粒幾鐘，2145 Second Group Project終於完工
拜婆婆，有乜理由約o左一個時間，自己早到，然後問人點解未到？
Eric，我不是路人，而是你日記